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The woman soldier.
This used to be an oxymoron. Even if there
were tales of women acting heroically in
warfare (think of Joan of Arc, think of the
Amazons), they were deemed anomalous
or just fanciful. In the mid-twentieth centu-
ry, women as armed combatants in insur-
gent forces – in China, Vietnam, Algeria,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Zim-
babwe, Eritrea, and the Philippines – be-
came more visible.
By the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury, the woman soldier seemed to have be-
come a globalized icon of the “modern wo-
man”. She was breaking feminized taboos,
entering a traditionally masculinized doma-
in, being deployed far from home, dis-
playing her physical strength, handling
high-tech weaponry. She was defying the
strictures of conventional, patriarchal femi-
ninity by proving that she could be the pro-
tector, not simply the protected – she, like
a manly man, could “die for her country”.
To some, the woman soldier was thereby
showing that a woman could be a “first-
class citizen” in her own country and a mi-
litarized “peacekeeper” around the world.
During the post-2011 devastating wars
in Syria and Iraq, most of the armed fig-
hting forces on the ground, regardless of
their competing political goals, reverted to
virtually all-male organizations. The Iraqi
Shiite militias, the Islamic State (ISIS) for-
ces, the rival Islamic-identified foreign figh-
ters’ insurgent militias, and the more secu-
lar Syrian antigovernment forces – the lea-
ders of each made masculinization their
core organizing principle. The exceptions
were the Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish insur-
gent forces, both of whose male leaders in-
corporated a significant number of women
as fighters. In this Syrian/Iraqi conflict,
however, women were valued and recruited
in order to play support roles, chiefly as
male fighters’ loyal wives (Callimachi 2015;
Jaffer 2015).
By contrast, at the same time, on the glo-
bal landscape of state militaries the woman
soldier was appearing everywhere. She was
smiling out from a Japanese Self-Defense
Forces recruiting advertisement; she was lo-
oking boldly at you from the Swedish milit-
ary’s website; she was marching in Viet-
nam’s patriotic veterans’ parades; she was
fighting in Syria with her Kurdish militia
comrades; she was donning the UN’s blue
helmet on an international peacekeeping
mission; she was on patrol in Afghanistan
with NATO forces; she was singing the nati-
onal anthem at an American sporting event;
as a wounded veteran, she was showing off
the agility of her prosthetic arm (Eager
2014; Enloe 2010; Kronsell 2012; Macken-
zie 2012; 2015; Sato 2012; Turner 1998).
There seemed to be a halo of modernity
glowing around this woman soldier. The
pursuit of modernity is one of the incenti-
ves that governments and individuals find
appealing for joining the process of globali-
zation. For some people today, no military
can claim to be a genuinely “modern mili-
tary” unless it allows at least some women
to join its ranks. In the late 1990s, Italy
was the last of all the NATO countries to
permit women to enlist. The all-male mili-
tary seemed to be going the way of the all-
male college. Today there are women soldi-
ers in the militaries ranging from those of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, India, South Africa,
and North Korea, to those of Norway,
South Korea, Colombia, Nepal, Fiji, and
China. Modernity, that pot of gold at the
end of the globalized rainbow, has deman-
ded that at least some women be permitted
access to soldiering.
This iconic image of the woman soldier
was reminiscent of an earlier globalized
image of the modern woman. She was po-
pularly called – and often proudly called
herself – the “New Woman”. During the
1910s and 1920s, she too popped up all
over the world. In cities such as Istanbul,
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Cairo, Seoul, Shanghai, Tokyo, Paris,
Chicago, Toronto, and London, she was
the young woman who left her small town
and migrated to the city. As a New Woman,
she thrived on the lively bustle and seeming
freedom of the big city. She wanted to ex-
perience independence, earning her own
wages in an office job and living with wo-
men friends in a boarding house or rented
apartment, away from the confines of fami-
ly supervision. The New Woman dressed in
newly relaxed fashions and read books and
slick magazines written for her and about
her. She resisted marriage until it could be
on her own terms. In many places she was
exercising her newly won right to vote; in
some places she was joining with other wo-
men to create public campaigns to open up
new opportunities for women (Ito 2006;
Ito and Morimoto 2004; Kwon 2000).
Some of these New Women were, just as
some of the contemporary women soldiers
are, feminists; that is, they deliberately ana-
lyzed, critiqued, and collectively challenged
the power systems that operated daily to
keep women socially confined, physically
constrained, economically dependent, and
politically sidelined. Many other women
who earlier aspired to become New Women
or who today enlist in the military, howe-
ver, eschew feminism. These women, thou-
gh adventurous, have been afraid that if
they are seen by their colleagues or the ge-
neral public as “feminists”, they will have a
harder time achieving their own unconven-
tional personal goals.
The contemporary woman soldier and
the earlier New Woman each was the object
of popular hope and admiration. But, not
surprisingly, each was – and still is – the tar-
get of intense debate and even scorn, since
both the woman soldier and the New Wo-
man – even if they did or do not embrace
the label “feminist” – undermined assump-
tions about biology, respectability, and fe-
mininity. These women thereby raised new
discomforting questions about the roles,
skills, and privileges of men.
The New Woman was a globalizing phe-
nomenon. Women in Seoul traveled to
Tokyo to meet and study with those Japan-
ese women writers and artists whose libera-
ted lives they admired. Women in China
and Japan translated and put on producti-
ons of Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibse-
n’s controversial play “A Doll’s House,”
which portrays one woman’s rebellion aga-
inst her claustrophobic middle-class marria-
ge (Weinbaum et al. 2008).
So too today women in militaries often –
not always – develop a global awareness
and create their own international ne-
tworks. They are keen to find out what is
going on in the lives of women soldiers in
other countries. They meet and compare
notes when they are deployed on joint pea-
cekeeping operations, when they travel ab-
road for special training courses, or when
they gather for conferences sponsored by
various advocacy groups to discuss the con-
tinuing barriers women soldiers face when
seeking promotions or simply respect: “Are
you allowed to serve in combat roles?” “Do
your superiors ignore women’s complaints
of sexual harassment?” “How have you ma-
naged to get your veterans’ hospitals to of-
fer services that address women’s repro-
ductive health issues?” (Manning 2006).
For all their intriguing similarities, how-
ever, the globalized New Woman of the
1910s and 1920s and today’s globalized
woman soldier are marked by a major diffe-
rence. The New Woman was typically the
object of contempt and even fear (she was
tearing apart the nation, she was a traitor to
the nationalist cause, she was upsetting the
“social order”). By stark contrast, women
in today’s state militaries – if they stay in
the roles their commanders assign them –
are there because government strategists
think they will enhance, not subvert, “nati-
onal security”:
(a) they will make up for the loss of middle-
class men caused by the repeal of male cons-
cription laws (“the draft”),
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(b) they will compensate for a decline in the
country’s birthrate (because many women are
having fewer babies than they did a generati-
on ago), 
(c) they will allow the government not to re-
cruit “too many” men from those ethnic and
racial groups the government’s elite doesn’t
respect or trust, 
(d) they will bring with them higher levels of
formal education than many of the country’s
young men achieve, 
(e) they can be assigned to search local wo-
men in Afghanistan without upsetting conser-
vative mores, 
(f) they will help make the government’s mi-
litary look “modern” in the eyes of many of
its own citizens and observers abroad.
As was true of the earlier New Women,
these women inside today’s militaries pro-
voke mixed responses, both admiration and
anxiety. Each group of women can benefit
their countries, many observers seem to im-
ply, only if their energies and talents can be
controlled in ways that direct them to ful-
filling the government’s goals.
The “only if” matters. Such conditions
can be tough to sustain when women in
any military start making alliances with sup-
portive civilian legislators or civil society
advocates, or when the military is stretched
thin and needs to open up loopholes to
make maximum use of all personnel – male
and female; young and old; gay, transgen-
der, and straight; racially privileged and ra-
cially marginalized. Thus, during the 2001-
2016 U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Ir-
aq, observers have noted that, despite deni-
als by senior officials that American women
were in “combat” – the hallowed role re-
served for generations solely for “manly”
men – in practice, women soldiers deployed
to both Iraq and Afghanistan were routine-
ly assigned by field commanders to combat
operations (Eager 2014; Enloe 2010;
Mackenzie 2015; Solaro 2006).
What can we investigate, then, by taking
seriously women soldiers in any military?
First, we can determine whether many wo-
men are joining military forces because
they believe it is the route to “first-class ci-
tizenship”. If we find out that they are,
then paying attention to women soldiers
becomes a strategy for analyzing the milita-
rization of citizenship. Second, we can di-
scover whether, in the civilian public’s eyes,
women serving as soldiers are becoming
symbols of the country’s “modernity”. If
they are, then taking women in the military
seriously will enable us to chart the militari-
zation of globalized modernity. Third, we
can determine whether the growing num-
bers of women soldiers in the military’s
ranks are persuading more and more civili-
ans that their own country’s military is no
longer sexist. If we find that that is so, then
our conducting a gender analysis of milita-
ries’ recruitment of women will help us un-
derstand how ongoing patriarchy can be
camouflaged.
Paying attention to women soldiers takes
stamina. It entails watching the recruitment
strategies and rationales of a government
over several decades. It simultaneously
requires listening to women soldiers them-
selves, women from diverse ethnic and raci-
al and socioeconomic backgrounds. For in-
stance, during the 1990s and early 2000s,
African American women constituted a sur-
prisingly high percentage of all active-duty
women enlisted in the U.S. Army – that is,
four times the percentage of African Ameri-
can women among all women in the gene-
ral U.S. population (Manning 2005). Since
2000, however, the percentage of African
American women among enlisted-rank mi-
litary women has been dropping – from a
high of 48 percent in the early 1990s, to
38 percent in 2005, to 31 percent in 2011.
This, of course, still is almost three times
their proportion of all women in the Unit-
ed States. Furthermore, it is a significantly
higher percentage than African American
men (16 percent) are of all U.S. military
men (Patten 2011).
In other words, paying attention to wo-
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men soldiers does not mean homogenizing
them. Instead, it entails taking seriously the
unequal tendencies of young women in dif-
ferent racial and ethnic groups within the
same society to join their country’s military.
Is an Afro-Colombian young woman as li-
kely to be attracted by the Colombian re-
cruiter’s appeal as a mestizo Colombian yo-
ung woman? Is a Bangladeshi British young
woman as likely to sign up for the British
Army as a white British young woman?
Moreover, once diverse women join any
military, they may have quite different ex-
periences as soldiers. Training opportunities
and promotions may not be equally distri-
buted across women of all backgrounds. All
women may not be equally subjected to
sexual harassment from male sergeants and
officers. Reactions to serving on peacekee-
ping missions, for instance, in the Congo,
South Sudan, or the Sinai, may not be
identical for women soldiers of all social
backgrounds within the same country’s
contingent. As always, being a gender ana-
lyst requires being constantly curious about
the inter-workings of gender with those of
class, race, and ethnicity.
“Paying attention” as a curious gender
analyst also requires listening to silences.
When women inside any military (or any
military academy) do not report sexual
abuse perpetrated by their male colleagues
and superiors – because they decide the mi-
litary justice system cannot be trusted, be-
cause they fear being ostracized as “turn-
coats” by their peers, or because they have
seen how other women’s careers have been
harmed after they have spoken up – that is
significant. It takes courage in any patriar-
chal institution to raise public objections to
masculinized abuse. Thus, for instance, one
might pay close attention to the more than
one hundred young women in the United
States who spoke up during 2005 alone,
charging that male military recruiters –
from all services – sexually harassed them
while in the process of trying to enlist
them. At the U.S. Army military academy
West Point in 2014, of all the women ca-
dets, 55 percent said that they had experi-
enced sexual harassment at the academy
(U.S. Department of Defense 2015). Per-
haps it was somehow easier for these young
women to break the silence because they
were still civilians and not yet officially in
the military. Or perhaps they were able to
speak out because most of them still lived
at home and had older adults, their parents,
to give them support when they reported
their experiences.
Women already serving in the British mi-
litary, for instance, have expressed little
confidence that, if they speak out about
their experiences of sexual harassment or
assault, they will be supported by their su-
periors or treated justly. They believe that
the military’s institutional culture tilts
toward privileging masculinity in ways that
will discredit their charges (Basham 2013;
Buchanan 2015). In one case that came to
the British courts, Corporal Leah Mates, a
thirty-year-old soldier with extensive pro-
fessional military experience, reported be-
ing subjected to repeated sexual bullying.
When her supervisors treated her reports of
the behavior dismissively, Corporal Mates
testified, “I now began to understand that
the Army is a male preserve, and a woman
who tries to establish herself does so at the
peril of her health and happiness” (Maley
2006).
In the United States in recent years, wo-
men’s advocacy groups outside the military,
such as the U.S.-based Service Women’s
Action Network (SWAN), have organized
to provide women inside the military sup-
port and validation when they dare to spe-
ak out about sexual violence and abuse in
the ranks. When the Defense Department’s
officials still have not listened, these activi-
sts have pushed members of Congress to
take their words seriously (www.servicewo-
men.org).
“Paying attention”, furthermore, calls
for listening to civilians – boyfriends, girlfri-
ends, husbands, mothers, fathers, teachers,
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journalists, elected officials, movie direc-
tors, civilian women and men in those
countries to which women soldiers are de-
ployed. Each group of observers weighs the
rightness and consequences of the women
in their lives serving in militaries. For in-
stance, a father who is a military veteran
may see his daughter’s enlistment as car-
rying on “the family tradition” – especially
if his son does not want to join the military.
On the other hand, a civilian boyfriend
might start worrying that if he and his sol-
dier-girlfriend get married and she stays in
the military, he will end up like a military
wife, acting as a single parent for months
while she is deployed overseas.
The percentage of women in the military
in various countries in 2010–2015 is shown
in table 5.1.
We need to treat these percentages with
caution. Even the relatively high percenta-
ges might not be evidence of contemporary
“post-sexist” enlightenment. The percenta-
ge of women in any country’s military may
wax and wane over time. For instance, du-
ring World War II, the U.S. government
deliberately recruited thousands of women
– white, African American, Chinese, Japan-
ese, Latina, Native American – to join the
Navy’s WAVES, the Army’s WAC, and the
Coast Guard’s SPARS, which were bran-
ches of the military created by the wartime
government especially for women. After
the war ended, male officials in the White
House, the War Department (then in char-
ge of the Army), the then-Department of
the Navy, and male-dominated Congress
together chose to demobilize women milit-
ary personnel to the point that they were
scarcely visible in the postwar ranks. To
make crystal clear their patriarchal point –
that a “normal” peacetime military should
be a thoroughly masculinized institution –
policymakers crafted rules limiting women
to a mere 2 percent of the total active-duty
force. This was the American military norm
throughout the Cold War. The 2 percent li-
mit was kept in place during the Korean
and Vietnam wars of the 1950s, 1960s, and
early 1970s.
The male leaders of the U.S. Congress,
along with their colleagues in the White
House and the Defense Department (for-
merly the War Department and now in
charge of all the armed forces, including the
newly organized Air Force), did not decide
they needed to lift this gendered ceiling un-
til the early 1970s. What changed? Faced
with the increasingly unpopular Vietnam
War, American policymakers ended  male
conscription – what Americans call “the
draft” – without changing their vision of
PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO WOMEN INSIDE MILITARIES 17
TABLE 5.1 PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN THE ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2010–2015
Country                 % Women                       Country                       % Women
Australia                        12.5                             Israel                                    30.0
Britain                           10.0                             Japan                                     5.4
Canada                          14.5                             Latvia                                   17.4
China                              7.5                             New Zealand                        16.5
Eritrea                           30.0                             Russia                                  10.0
France                           15.0                             South Africa                         26.0
Germany                          8.5                             United States                       14.0
the U.S. role in the world, which called for
a globally deployed military. That is, they
ended the male draft, but held on tightly to
their presumed need for thousands of new
military recruits every year. This obviously
posed a dilemma. Their solution: recruit
more women. Still, how to do it in a way
that would not surrender the military’s
long-standing attraction as the place where
“boys become men”? How to maintain the
military’s role in sustaining the country’s
patriarchal social system? It would become
a tricky ideological operation.
The Soviet Union’s military planners did
much the same. They used thousands of
women to help wage their fierce World War
II battles against the invading German for-
ces. But at the end of the war, they imple-
mented policies allowing the Soviet military
to revert to its “natural” masculinized insti-
tutional self, dependent on male conscripti-
on. Then, in the 1990s, after the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the remaining Russian
government launched a draining war aga-
inst rebel forces in the southern province of
Chechnya. Service in the Russian military
lost its patriotic appeal. Many Russian mo-
thers even began urging their sons to avoid
the draft after these women had uncovered
the brutal hazing rituals that drove some
young conscripts to commit suicide
(Sperling 2003).
In the wake of the failed 1980s war in
Afghanistan and as the war in Chechnya
dragged on, disillusionment with military
service deepened further still. No longer
did soldiering seem a rewarding route to
authentic manliness. More young male sol-
diers saw their friends sent home from Afg-
hanistan in sealed zinc coffins or heard
from older brothers what awaited them in
Chechnya and went absent without leave
(AWOL) instead (Alexievich 1992; Eichler
2012). It was at this point that Russian mi-
litary planners began to look favorably on
women as recruits (Mathers 2006). In the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the govern-
ment began recruitment campaigns to per-
suade women to join the military at the sa-
me time as many young Russian women
were finding it very difficult to get decent
jobs in the uncertain Russian civilian em-
ployment market (Cohn 2013).
In neither the United States nor Russia
have the male military planners and their
legislative colleagues talked about “patri-
archy”. Those officials and legislators who,
after years of deliberately “remasculinizing”
their post–World War II militaries, decided
to enlist more women volunteers were not
motivated chiefly by a desire to liberate wo-
men or to lessen masculinized privilege in
their country’s public life. Instead, both
Russian and U.S. officials were motivated
primarily by their desire to continue their
wide-ranging military operations at a time
when they were losing easy access to young
male recruits.
South Africa’s story is rather different, at
least in its most current chapter. The South
African government’s efforts to enlist wo-
men volunteers began in earnest under the
country’s racist apartheid regime. As the
small white ruling minority began to face
stronger resistance from the country’s com-
bined black, mixed-race, and Asian majori-
ty, the country’s political leaders, imbued
with patriarchal beliefs derived from a strict
brand of Calvinist theology, struggled to
sustain a large enough military force to
match the new challenge to its authoritari-
an rule: there weren’t enough young white
male conscripts to fill the ranks. The
apartheid regime thus tried to craft a deli-
cate balancing act. They recruited more
black South African male volunteers and at
the same time – despite the white male eli-
te’s very conservative views about respect-
able femininity – opened new military roles
to women volunteers from all communities,
though especially white women.
Then in 1994, when the apartheid regi-
me fell and a new constitutional system was
created to ensure nonracist democracy, in-
tense discussions began among South Afri-
cans about the appropriate composition of
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the state’s newly reconstructed military.
There was agreement that this new post-
apartheid military should consist wholly of
volunteers, not conscripts, and that it sho-
uld have many more black senior officers.
But should it revert to its pre-1980s mostly
male composition? South African women’s
advocates argued that although the just-de-
posed apartheid elites had recruited large
numbers of women into the ranks for the
sake of upholding their own racist system, a
new democratic military should not simply
dismiss women soldiers (Cock 1995).
Thus, the fact that today’s South African
military has one of the world’s highest pro-
portions of women in uniform is not the
result of a continuation of a recent masculi-
nist and racist political calculation. Rather,
it is the product of thoughtful feminist-in-
formed analysis to determine the sorts of
relationships between women, the military,
and a nascent nonracist political system that
would be most likely to ensure a less patri-
archal democracy.
Today in dozens of countries an unresol-
ved analytical debate continues over the
magnitude – and direction – of military and
societal transformation produced by enli-
sting more women in the military. In 2014,
claiming to be acting in the name of gender
equality, the Norwegian parliament – much
to the surprise and even dismay of many
Norwegian feminist peace activists – passed
a new law that expanded formerly male on-
ly compulsory military service to women.
Israel is another country in which wo-
men’s role in the military has become cen-
tral to debates about not just security,
but citizenship. While acknowledging that
Israel is one of the very few countries in
which both women and men are subject to
military conscription, Israeli gender scho-
lars note that women are drafted for shor-
ter terms than men, that most women sol-
diers are channeled into traditionally femi-
nized military jobs – for instance, secreta-
ries, instructors, nurses, and other admini-
strative positions – and that women are ex-
empted from military service whenever the-
ir family responsibilities conflict. In Israeli
society, as in most societies, women are
seen first and foremost as mothers and
daughters, not as architects of the nation’s
security or as the country’s protectors.
Most important, it is the male combat sol-
dier who remains the ideal of the true
Israeli citizen (Sasson-Levy 2003). Thus,
the impressive statistic that 30 percent of
the Israeli military are women must be the
start, not the end, of a feminist investigati-
on of masculinity, national security, and mi-
litarism in Israel – just as  such numbers
must be the starting points for feminist in-
vestigations in other countries.
With that in mind, Israeli feminist invest-
igators have paid close attention to how the
Israeli woman soldier is portrayed by the
popular Israeli media and by the military
establishment itself. Most often, women
soldiers are portrayed as conventionally fe-
minine, sexual, and appealing in the eyes of
their male colleagues, as if the woman sol-
dier’s physical attractiveness played a role in
bolstering the morale of male soldiers,
who, the images imply, are the ones actual-
ly taking the risks and confronting the real
dangers in the service of national security
(Brownfield-Stein 2006). In any military it
is worth monitoring how women soldiers
are portrayed in order to chart the ways
both the government and ordinary citizens
try to balance the competing goals of, on
the one hand, enlisting women in the co-
untry’s protective force and, on the other
hand, still maintaining many of their own
core patriarchal values and beliefs.
An Israeli feminist scholar who explored
the same politics of “having their cake and
eating it too” listened closely to those wo-
men, a minority of a minority, who have
been allowed to hold “nontraditional” –
that is, presumably masculinized – jobs in
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). What she
found is that these women have done their
best to fit into the IDF’s dominant mascu-
linized culture. They have often adopted
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more masculinized humor, more masculini-
zed modes of walking, and lower voice re-
gisters. Most of these women in traditional-
ly masculinized jobs have also tried to deny
any experiences of sexual harassment by
their male colleagues. For instance, one
woman soldier, whom the author calls
“Rutti,” told of noncommissioned officers
in her combat-engineering platoon taunt-
ing her with “Rutti is a whore”. She never
thought of reporting incidents like this. In-
stead, Rutti tried to shrug it off, saying,
“Obviously, it wasn’t fun. It’s annoying,
but you can’t take it too hard. It’s a trivial
song, nobody notices it, nobody pays at-
tention to it” (Sasson-Levy 2003). While
such a personal interpretation may work as
a private survival strategy for a woman iso-
lated in a masculinized institution, letting
such misogynistic and harassing practices
go unchallenged leaves the existing mascu-
linized military culture firmly in place, per-
haps even reaffirmed (Sasson-Levy 2003).
A current international debate is over
this question: Would UN peacekeeping
missions be more effective in war zones if
the contributing states’ military contin-
gents (the “blue helmets”) had higher pro-
portions of women soldiers?
The responsibility for contributing tro-
ops to UN global peacekeeping missions is
not shared equally. A majority of these
blue-helmeted soldiers come from poor
countries. Among the top contributors to-
day are Nepal, Uruguay, Benin, Cameroon,
Senegal, Rwanda, Niger, Burundi, and
Indonesia.
In 2015, a mere 3 percent of military
personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping
operations around the world were women.
Men constituted 97 percent of those soldi-
ers contributed by member states to UN
peacekeeping missions. At the same time,
men made up 90 percent of all the police
personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping
missions to conflict areas; only 10 percent
were women (www.un.org/en/peacekee-
ping).
The proponents of increasing the presen-
ce of women soldiers and police officers in
globalized peace operations argue that wo-
men do not spark local antagonisms as
much as male soldiers do. One male officer
responsible for training Indian army offi-
cers for peacekeeping assignments said that
women officers were valuable for “their
ability to pick up local languages . . . [and
for] their knack for integrating their own
culture with new ones” (Hindustan Times
2006). They also, this line of reasoning
continues, are more able to create mea-
ningful relationships with local women,
crucial players in reweaving social fabrics af-
ter war. Some proponents of increasing the
proportions of women soldiers in interna-
tional peacekeeping deployments draw on
essentialist understandings of gender, argu-
ing that women are by nature better at pea-
cebuilding than are men.
Yet some feminist peace activists, for in-
stance those in New Zealand, have voiced
concern that some government officials will
imagine that simply adding more women
soldiers to their own UN peacekeeping
contingents will be a sufficient action to
roll back patriarchal approaches to interna-
tional peacebuilding. These analysts insist
that meaningful peacebuilding will require
a lot deeper gendered transformation (Pea-
ce Movement Aotearoa 2015).
When government officials – legislators,
defense experts, military planners – consi-
der a wide range of questions when they
devise military recruitment strategies, typi-
cally they deny asking some of these:
• Who is trustworthy enough to be given a
gun?
• Whose exclusion from the new security
forces will undermine the fragile peace?
• Whose exclusion won’t matter?
• Whose inclusion in the ranks will make
the new military trusted by the general citi-
zenry?
• Whose skills are needed?
• Whose immediate needs are best satisfied
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via the pay and other rewards and benefits
that soldiering brings?
Typically, these discussions feature debates
about ethnic, regional, racial, class, and po-
litical party loyalties – not gender. The uns-
poken presumption shared by the partici-
pants around the policymaking table – that
is, the local leaders and overseas donors,
advisors, and diplomats – frequently is that
they are talking about men. Why? Because
it is widely believed that it is men’s rivalries
and unmet needs that will upset the tenu-
ous calm. It is the threats that men pose
that must be urgently addressed. And only
occasionally is the exclusion of women
from the ranks and officer corps of the new
military deemed a threat to the fragile pos-
twar peace. Women? Their issues can wait
until later. But “later” can be a long time
away.
Sometimes, however, the topic of wome-
n’s inclusion does get on the table, especi-
ally if some of the people around the table
have broader, less-militarized notions of
“national security”. These people (some
perhaps with personal experience in wo-
men’s grassroots groups) will likely be thin-
king of dismantling the masculinist culture
of the former military, perhaps seeing mas-
culinist military culture – and not simply
past ethnic or partisan loyalties – as at least
partly to blame for outbreaks of violence
and as sowing the seeds of civilian distrust
and alienation. Still, underneath the surface
of the discussion will lurk the nagging qu-
estion: does adding more women to a mi-
litary have any significant impact at all?
Since the 1980s, some Japanese defense
policymakers have adopted a similar mode
of thinking. On the one hand, Japan has a
constitution that pledges the country both
to never again adopt military force as a me-
ans of resolving problems and to refrain
from creating a military with which to wi-
eld such force. On the other hand, today
Japan (thanks in part to the strong urging
of the U.S. government) actually has a for-
midable military equipped with the most
up-to-date technology. In practice, the Ja-
panese military, whose formal name is the
Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), deploys
its soldiers only on humanitarian missions,
and the soldiers never fire their guns.
Yet there is a profound awkwardness that
the Japanese must cope with: the fact that
the constitutional antimilitary principle ex-
ists side by side with an institutional reality.
One way male policymakers have devised
for smoothing out the contradictions that
are creating this sense of this political unea-
se is to bring more Japanese women into
the SDF. Women constitute only 5 percent
of total SDF personnel today, and their ro-
les do not give them much influence in mi-
litary decisionmaking. But male policyma-
kers hope that putting the nonthreatening
smiling faces of young SDF women on the
military’s recruitment ads and other public
relations materials will reassure Japanese
supporters of the country’s post–World
War II nonaggression principles that the
SDF is a friendly, nonviolent institution.
For some of the young women soldiers
themselves who enlisted with hopes of avo-
iding the tokenism they routinely encoun-
ter in Japanese civilian companies, this su-
perficial public relations ploy generates not
pride, but disappointment and frustration
(Fruhstuck 2006).
This Japanese debate over military recru-
itment has taken on new salience with the
governing party, the Liberal Democratic
Party, being led by a prime minster deter-
mined to remilitarize Japan. Shinzo Abe
sees Japan’s current “peace constitution” as
a drag on Japan’s global influence. His ar-
gument is that Japan will only be treated by
other international elites as a “mature”
player in the global community (for instan-
ce, gaining a seat as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council) if it expands
its military’s role in international affairs.
Many Japanese disagree. Among the most
outspoken opponents of this vision are Ja-
panese feminists.
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Optimistic commentators on military af-
fairs predict that increasing the proportion
of women (thus decreasing the proportion
of men) in a military will make that military
less patriarchal: the higher the percentage
of women in a military, they believe, the
less the traditional privileging of masculini-
ty will be able to survive. Patriarchal beliefs
and ways of relating simply will prove unte-
nable.
If they are dedicated optimists, they mig-
ht go further and even predict that this mi-
litary will become less militarized. Yes, a
less-militarized military. What would that
look like? Sandra Whitworth, a Canadian
feminist and international politics expert,
has been critical of how militarized the
Canadian UN peacekeeping operations
have become. Still, she starts off her thoug-
htful book about militarized peacekeeping
with a tribute to a seemingly less-militari-
zed military: she candidly recalls how glad
she was to see Canadian soldiers arrive at
her farmhouse in the midst of a brutal ice
storm. They were soldiers, but they were
also friendly, helpful, nonviolent rescuers
(Whitworth 2004).
During the years 2006–2015, under the
leadership of Prime Minister Stephen
Harper and his Conservative government,
the Canadian military became more milita-
rized as it followed the US-led NATO ope-
rations into Afghanistan. After Justin
Trudeau and his Liberal Party won a new
majority in the 2015 Canadian parliamen-
tary elections, however, the process was
reversed. One of his first acts as the new
prime minister was to end the Canadian
military’s combat role in Afghanistan, a
step that might have signaled a more gene-
ral demilitarization of the country’s foreign
policy. It will take a gender analyst, though,
to investigate whether this change alters the
relationships of masculinities and feminini-
ties inside the Canadian military.
A less-militarized military would be one
less focused on a combat role and less im-
bued with an institutional culture of mas-
culinized violence. It would be a military
less committed to a hierarchical, threat-
filled worldview; having an “enemy”
wouldn’t be so central to the military’s
raison d’être. It would also be a military
whose soldiers and their senior officers
would take at least as much (or more?) sa-
tisfaction in rescuing civilians from the ra-
vages of ice storms, hurricanes, and earth-
quakes as in rolling into a combat zone in
their intimidating armored vehicles. It
would be a military in which officers who
serve in successful humanitarian operations,
not those with combat experience, would
have the best chance of being promoted to
general or admiral.
According to this optimistic analysis, if,
for instance, the proportion of women sol-
diers rises from just 1 percent of the state’s
military to 15 percent, masculinization and
patriarchy – as well as militarization – will
likely be stalled and perhaps even rolled
back.
Of course, there is a second, less rosy
forecast: increasing the percentage of wo-
men serving inside the state’s military
could cause those women to become more
militarized. Simultaneously, pessimists pre-
dict, the general public’s acceptance of wo-
men as soldiers will send the roots of milit-
arizing culture down even deeper into the
ecology of the entire society. A military
with at least 10 percent women in its ranks
will no longer look “out of step” with the
rest of society. That is, with at least a smat-
tering of women (and featuring those wo-
men in recruiting ads, as well as encoura-
ging media coverage of their activities) a
military won’t look like a bastion of bygone
maleness. The military thereby will be har-
der than ever to distinguish from civilian
society. That could make it harder to scruti-
nize the military’s persistent masculinized
institutional culture and to raise questions
about the military’s exemptions from many
of the rules and procedures that the civilian
public must live by. This more pessimistic
analytical forecast is based on the assess-
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ment that masculinization, militarization,
and patriarchy don’t just roll over in the fa-
ce of change. Each operates within the mi-
litary as a socializing pressure: the “outsi-
ders” (women) entering the military’s re-
alm are likely to adopt as their own the al-
ready established – and rewarding – patriar-
chal beliefs and values.
There is yet a third possibility. Sustaining
and challenging patriarchy – these oppos-
ing forces might coexist in the same society,
or in the same institution. Thus, so too
might militarizing and demilitarizing pro-
cesses. The result would be a surprising mix
of pressures and tendencies. An important
characteristic of militarized patriarchal
states and patriarchal militaries: their poli-
cymakers can be confused, contradictory,
and ambivalent.
Those men and women who have a stake
in perpetuating a patriarchal culture and
structure – who see it as good for themsel-
ves, good for their families, good for their
own society, and even good for the world –
are not immune to confusion. For instance,
they may want to preserve the dominant
masculine culture of their state’s military
and, at the same time, conclude that it is
necessary to enlist more women because
birthrates are dropping (and so the pool of
young men is shrinking), because more ma-
le conscripts are going AWOL, or because
nervous legislators are responding to the
public’s disillusionment by voting to end
male conscription. Trying to achieve both
of these goals can produce confusion and
contradictory actions.
The temptation among patriarchal poli-
cymakers, however, is to deny confusion –
to hide it, to camouflage it under a paint
job of convoluted justification. Usually this
compels those confused policymakers to
spend a lot of energy trying to manipulate
definitions of “femininity”. In doing this,
they will probably look like the South
Korean regime of Chung Hee Park, which
in the 1960s and 1970s mobilized young
women to leave home in order to serve as
“cheap labor” in sneaker and electronics
factories, while it simultaneously tried to
convince these young women and their
parents that “dutiful daughter” was their
chief feminine identity.
Any patriarchy survives and thrives only
if its leaders and members can perpetuate a
widely accepted standard of “proper” femi-
ninity. A dominant notion of “proper” fe-
mininity is especially potent when it be-
comes the basis by which women (and gir-
ls) judge, or “police”, each other. Such dai-
ly judging – of girls and women by girls
and women – creates divisive hierarchies
among women, making it more likely that
they will see other girls or women as sour-
ces of competition or even as
threats to their own sense of well-being.
This sort of preoccupation makes it less li-
kely that girls and women will notice how
the larger pattern of relationships, rules,
and presumptions of patriarchy shapes their
own lives, much less that they will join to-
gether as women to challenge masculinized
privilege. That is, when racism, class pre-
judice, nationalism, patriotism, militarism,
and competition for boyfriends and hus-
bands divide women and girls and divert
their attention, patriarchy becomes more
secure.
Second, if the promoters of a patriarchal
system are skillful, they will manage to ma-
ke “femininity” appear natural – not the
product of human decisions. This feat ma-
kes their own uses of power harder to see.
If they can achieve this, then the entire pa-
triarchal order is likely to take on the status
of “natural” and thus not open to funda-
mental challenge.
Yet as we can see when we pay close at-
tention to women in the military, there are
many times when promoters of patriarchy
find it difficult to sustain the naturalness of
the dichotomy between “masculinity” and
“femininity” and the propriety (positive va-
lue) of a certain mode of feminine behavi-
or. These times of patriarchal discomfort
and confusion are especially useful to ex-
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plore. That exploration is likely to bear the
most fruit if one conducts it with an expli-
cit feminist curiosity, because a feminist cu-
riosity will keep one alert to how even con-
fused ideas about masculinity and feminini-
ty can determine who has power and who
is marginalized.
Patriarchal confusion often occurs du-
ring wartime or when a government is
most eager to prepare for war. At first glan-
ce, this may seem unlikely. After all, it is
during wartime that the masculinity of the
protector is most entrenched in its privile-
ge, while the dependent femininity of the
grateful protected is most celebrated. But
let’s look again. And listen. Researchers
who have been digging into the complex
realities of the American Civil War, World
War II, the Vietnam War, and the current
wars in Africa and the Middle East are
showing us that policymakers who believe
in the naturalness and rightness of a patriar-
chal social order nonetheless will violate
conventional tenets of masculine and femi-
nine difference so that they can use women
in new, “nontraditional” ways for the sake
of bolstering their war-waging efforts.
It is not that these wartime patriarchal
officials have shed their patriarchal beliefs
and values. Instead, feminist historians have
revealed, these officials convince themselves
that they can violate their own (and most
civilians’) gender rules just for the war years
and then, in peacetime, reestablish the alle-
ged “natural order”. In practice, this turns
out to be politically risky because it can
produce confusion.
As intriguing as it is to explore this milit-
arized patriarchal confusion, some feminist
investigators have been wary of devoting
intellectual energy to the study of women
who become soldiers. These investigators
worry that simply by taking seriously the
condition of women in the military and su-
ch women’s experiences and ideas, they
unintentionally might help legitimize both
the military as a public institution and sol-
diering as an occupation. The worries of
these feminists are rooted in a smart, if pes-
simistic, analysis that recognizes how se-
ductive militarization can be. It is true that
a researcher or journalist (feminist or non-
feminist) can start out neutrally studying a
military and can then gradually – unconsci-
ously – start absorbing not only the di-
scourse but the deeper assumptions of that
military and of its civilian strategists (Cohn
1987).
However, the militarization of a resear-
cher (or journalist) is not inevitable
(Basham, Belkin, and Gifkins 2015; Enloe
2015). To do feminist research of any patri-
archal institution and of women living their
lives inside that patriarchal institution (e.g.,
women in corporations, women in legisla-
tures, women in civil service, women in law
firms) one does need to acknowledge the
risks and thus to cultivate a heightened
consciousness of how one’s own compassi-
on and imagination, one’s own sense of the
“good story”, one’s own sense of “serious-
ness” each can become militarized in the
process of investigating women inside mi-
litaries. The telltale sign that one’s investi-
gation of women inside militaries is beco-
ming militarized may be that one stops
asking about militarism. One begins to be
interested solely in equality and inequality.
However, the risks and the effort it takes to
avoid those risks are worth taking, for we
will never fully understand patriarchy’s
adaptive qualities and its limits if we avoid
studying those women who are trying to
pursue their own goals inside such patriar-
chal institutions.
The importance of this gendered assign-
ment strategy means that one should
always keep a sharp eye on any military’s
changing definitions of combat. For instan-
ce, even within NATO, whose leaders put
so much emphasis on the standardization
of weaponry and doctrine, there have been
definitional differences in what constitutes
a “combat” job and thus where women can
or cannot serve alongside men. Moreover,
some NATO members have gone further:
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since the late 1980s, some have eliminated
the male-only combat rule altogether. The
Dutch led the way, followed closely by the
Norwegians and the Canadians.
The Americans and British were among
the most reluctant to give up the male-only
combat rule. Thus, it is they who continu-
ed to invest the most political energy in de-
fining and redefining exactly what consti-
tutes “combat”. In the 1980s, for instance,
the U.S. Army broadened the definition of
“combat” to include even the jobs done by
electricians and carpenters because, alleged-
ly, carpenters and electricians sometimes
were called upon to perform their work ne-
ar the line of fire. This meant that women
soldiers could be excluded from jobs as ele-
ctricians and carpenters in the name of pro-
tecting them from the dangers of combat.
One of the facts that made the male-only
combat rule seem irrational was that all
thirteen of the U.S. military women who
were killed in the Gulf War of 1990-1991
were women in what were bureaucratically
then defined as “noncombat” positions
(Enloe 1993; 2000).
During the next decade, under pressure
from the Women’s Caucus in Congress –
and facing the need to have more flexibility
in assignments – the army narrowed its de-
finition of “combat”. Only in 2013 did the
U.S. government, under President Barack
Obama, with Congressional support, drop
its ban on women in combat. On the other
hand, actual implementation proved far
more murky, with each branch of the ar-
med services crafting their own measures to
position women in combat – or to keep
them out (Mackenzie 2015).
In most of today’s modernized militari-
es, it is the submarine corps, armored divi-
sions, fighter plane squadrons, paratroops,
infantry regiments, and irregular elite for-
ces, such as the U.S. Army’s Special Forces,
that remain the inner sanctums of masculi-
nity. Perhaps not surprisingly, these are also
the groups within most militaries that are
the principal recruiting grounds for future
generals and admirals. This is how patri-
archy operates in an era of women’s rights
and globalized modernization.
Under pressure from citizens, many go-
vernments have ended male conscription.
These are the governments that have been
the most determined to enlist more women
as volunteers without sacrificing their milit-
ary’s useful masculinized culture. These go-
vernments’ military strategists have become
especially interested in recruiting those yo-
ung women with high school or even colle-
ge educations because modern militaries re-
ly on higher literacy and mathematical skil-
ls, and in many countries today a higher
proportion of young women than young
men are completing high school and colle-
ge.
On the other hand, officials do not want
women’s presence in their military to dilute
what they see to be the essence of the insti-
tution: its deep affiliation with manliness.
So, at the same time as they recruit women
to acquire their needed skills, these officials
worry that if the military’s core masculini-
zed culture is significantly diluted, two dire
things will happen. First, a weakened mas-
culinized esprit de corps will produce a mi-
litary that is a less-effective instrument of
coercive force. Second, if the popular ima-
ge of soldiering loses its masculine aura, a
lot of young men (potential enlistees) will
decide to walk right past the recruiter’s of-
fice: “Who wants to join an organization
that’s gone the way of bank telling?” It is
with these two patriarchal anxieties (about
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military effectiveness and about male
psychology) in their minds that most mili-
tary planners and their civilian colleagues
go about trying to craft their strategies for
recruiting and deploying women to com-
pensate for the men they have lost with the
end of male conscription. It has turned out
to be a “patriarchal challenge”. The resul-
ting practices, not surprisingly, have been
confusing, contradictory, and often harmful
to the women recruits.
Military policymakers have become more
reliant on women recruits, yet still seek to
reassure the public (and male soldiers) that
men in the military will not surrender their
“masculinity” when serving with women
and that even women who join the military
will stay “feminine”. Such an insistent reas-
surance might imply to some listeners that
one can masculinize or demasculinize any
activity. Yes, a soldier in khaki sitting in an
office at a typewriter pecking out the com-
mander’s memos might have been secure in
his masculinity back in the 1940s, but in
the 2000s that is a military job that should
be done by a khaki-clad woman. The impli-
cation: the differences between women and
men are not so intrinsically natural after all.
Instead, the differences between what men
do and what women do are largely the pro-
duct of human imagination and decision-
making. At this point, the patriarchal alarm
bells might begin to ring.
Dear Worried Patriarchal Public,
We are bringing women into this military in-
stitution, where you and we know they do not
naturally belong, for the sake of national secu-
rity. National security must take priority over
our beliefs about what is natural and what is
proper. But don’t worry. We know this is a tem-
porary aberration. We, like you, know this is
not natural; it is not what we are all fighting
for. So we guarantee you that we will rely on
this aberration for only a brief time, until we
win this war. Then, dear public, having won
the war, we will return women to their domes-
tic spheres where they really belong and so the
military back to its natural masculinized or-
der and thus the whole social order back to nor-
mal. Trust us.
This is an imagined letter to confused citi-
zens from military planners struggling to
cope with personnel shortages. The patriar-
chal message is: once the war is over, once
the threat to national security has receded,
then the natural and proper gendered social
order will be reassuringly restored. This im-
plicit message – sent out in various forms
by governments as diverse as the Soviet go-
vernment, the American government, and
the South African government – makes the
postwar years a time to watch carefully. For
the reassuring implication is that in the
postwar era, women will return – or be re-
turned – to their natural and proper femi-
nine places and roles. Even in revolutionary
Algeria, China, Guatemala, Vietnam, El
Salvador, and Eritrea, these patterns have
indeed been repeated: once the imminent
threat to national security has receded, wo-
men’s public space shrinks. Most obvious is
the demobilization of women from the
ranks of the military. But this demobiliza-
tion often goes hand in hand with the re-
masculinization of other spheres of public
life such as political parties, factory work,
and farm management (Krosch 2005;
Turner 1998).
Therefore, as investigators, we need to
turn our feminist curiosity to the weeks,
months, and even years immediately fol-
lowing the formal end of any inter-state or
civil war. Those will be the times when –
blatantly or subtly – policymakers (and
their allies in the media, academia, and bus-
iness) will try to take steps to terminate the
wartime “aberration” and return the milita-
ry (and thus society) to its patriarchal “nor-
mality”.
That is, to make sense of the gendered
dynamics of homegrown and globalized
militarization, the postwar years are as in-
teresting to investigate as the war years.
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